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In theory, competitive electricity markets can provide incentives for efficient 
investment in generating capacity. We show that if consumers and investors are risk 
averse, investment is efficient only if investors in generating capacity can sign long-
term contracts with consumers. Otherwise the uncovered price risk increases 
financing costs, reduces equilibrium investment levels, distorts technology choice 
towards less capital-intensive generation and reduces consumer utility. We observe 
insufficient levels of long-term contracts in existing markets, possibly because retail 
companies are not credible counter-parties if their final customers can switch easily. 
With a consumer franchise, retailers can sign long-term contracts, but this solution 
comes at the expense of the idea of retail competition. Alternative capacity 
mechanisms to stimulate investment are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
In California, Norway, Sweden, Brazil, New Zealand and Italy wholesale electricity 
prices increased significantly when geneartion capacity became scarce. This has 
instigated a debate whether liberalized electricity markets provide sufficient incentives 
for investment in generating capacity to ensure electricity supply at affordable prices. 
According to the theory of spot pricing, electricity spot markets can achieve efficient 
outcomes both in the short-term operation and in long-term investment decisions 
(Caramanis et al., 1982). The (spot) price varies, similar to spot prices in other markets, 
to match demand and supply. However, the variations are more frequent and extreme 
than in other commodity markets, because storage of electricity is too costly for 
commercial application, other than pumped-hydro (cf. Shuttleworth, 1997; Hirst and 
Hadley, 1999). Observed shortages of investment in generating capacity are generally 
attributed to artificial obstacles to the proper functioning of the market mechanism, such 
as price caps on spot markets, or permit requirements and planning approval for new 
investment. 
 
It is not uniformly accepted that removing these obstacles and regulatory risk will suffice 
to guarantee adequate investment (De Vries and Hakvoort 2002, Turvey 2003). Hence 
England and Wales, under the pool regime, and Spain and a number of South American 
systems use capacity payments to stimulate investment in generating capacity (Vázquez 
et al., 2002), while systems on the East Coast of the USA (PJM, the New York Power 
Pool and the New England Power Pool) use capacity requirements (PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C., 2001; Besser et al., 2002). Most European systems, on the other hand, expect the 
energy market to provide sufficient incentives for investment and have not implemented 
additional policies. 
 
We start from the premise that a market with appropriate risk management tools allow 
parties to manage uncertainty efficiently and provides competitive generating companies 
with an incentive to produce an optimal volume of generating capacity. The optimal 
equilibrium volume of generating capacity would require consumers to sign contracts 
with generating companies for their expected electricity output for a number of years in 
advance. In the current model of competition between retail companies, the retail 
companies would have to sign these contracts. However, they cannot carry the price risk 
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involved in such contracts, so in turn they would want to specify in their contracts with 
final customers a termination period of an equal number of years or a cancellation 
payment. However, regulators currently strive to reduce the barriers against switching by 
final customers in order to increase retail competition and reduce retail margins. If 
switching of electricity contracts would take years, or would alternatively involve 
switching costs similar to those observed in the refinancing of bank loans, then the 
struggle of regulators for retail competition would be lost. Hence the paradigm of retail 
competition is incompatible with long-term contracting for electricity.2 
 
If the above described reason or other constraints restrict long-term contracting, then the 
market cannot implement the first-best solution. This has three implications. First, 
consumer welfare is slightly reduced, because consumers cannot hedge electricity price 
risk. Secondly, investment in peaking capacity is only remunerated in times with 
generation scarcity, and hence faces volatile returns. Investors require higher rates of 
return, and postpone their investment until the expected electricity price is higher. Third 
annual price volatility also increases volatility of revenue streams for base load 
generation if sales are not covered by long-term contracts. This increases the required 
rate of return, capital costs and hence investors will choose less capital-intensive 
generating technologies, even if this creates higher fuel costs. A lack of long-term 
contracts biases technology choice against energy efficient technologies and might 
further increase costs of providing electricity. 
  
The lack of long-term contracting on behalf of consumers creates additional costs. Green 
(2004) shows that the inability of retail companies to sign long-term contracts increases 
the energy sales volume in the spot market and induces generation companies to exercise 
more market power and push up equilibrium electricity prices. Green suggests reinstating 
consumer franchises such that supply companies face a stable customer base. The 
                                                 
2
 Oren (2003) quotes a proposal by Reliant that retail companies sign long-term hedging contracts. The 
customer base of individual retail companies is difficult to anticipate, hence the indipendent system 
operator (ISO) is requested to sign long-term hedging companies as a supplier of last resort and sell them at 
any point in time to retail companies at cost-based rates. This proposal seems attractive for retail 
companies, if generating capacity turns out to be abundant, then they buy cheap hedging contracts from the 
market, if it is scarce, then they obtain these contracts from the ISO at initial purchasing costs. The profit-
maximizing strategy for retail companies seems to be to buy short term. This implies that the ISO needs to 
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challenge is to ensure that the supply companies with the local monopoly granted 
through the franchise face sufficient incentive to negotiate low contract prices with 
generators. Green suggests using yard-stick competition between franchises to achieve 
this objective. Alternatively one could envisage tender auctions for long-term contracts to 
ensure low prices, as successfully implemented in New Jersey for the supply of residual 
residential customers.3 
 
Cowan (2002) assesses the effect of the price volatility of fuels used to generate 
electricity. He also concludes that consumers are best off if they hedge their price risk 
with long-term contracts for their expected demand. In addition, they should be exposed 
to marginal prices for any deviations from the expected demand so that short-term 
efficiency is achieved. The authors assume that consumers either sign direct hedging 
contracts in parallel with their electricity contracts or choose between flexible and fixed 
tariffs. However, as argued section 4, retail companies exposed to competition cannot 
offer fixed retail tariffs corresponding to long-term hedging contracts. We share Cowan’s 
perspective on the value of hedging energy prices and expand it to implications of long-
term contracts on the investment volume. If consumers or retail companies hold long-
term contracts on behalf of consumers, these reveal the consumers’ expected future 
demand to the generating companies and reduce quantity risk for investment. 
 
This paper does not address the more general question of system security. Insufficient 
investment in generating capacity will increase the frequency with which system 
operators are forced to shed load. However if security margins are retained, then this 
should not affect system security. Arguably, system operators can delay load shedding by 
reducing the operating margin of the system. They are exposed to complaints if load is 
shed and do not fully internalize the risk to which their strategy exposes neighboring 
system operators in the entire network. This may mean that reduced generation adequacy 
may affect system security. It is currently being discussed to what extent shortages in 
Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and Italy were caused by insufficient generation capacity 
                                                                                                                                                 
negotiate all long-term hedging contracts and effectively takes over the main objective for the creation of 
retail competition – bargaining for low energy prices.  
3
 An auction was implementd to purchase one-year and three-year contracts for total of 18,000MW of 
generation on behalf of PSE&G, JCP&L, ACECO and RECO. (See optimalauctions.com) 
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(Woo et al., 2003; Nilssen and Walther, 2001; Lindqvist, 2001; Leyland, 2003; Fraser 
and Lo Passo, 2003). 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly recapitulates the theory of 
spot pricing as the starting point of the analysis. Section 3 analyses the impact of 
uncertainty on the amount of contracts risk neutral and avers consumers and investors 
would sign. Section 4 illustrates why in the current market design generation companies 
are reluctant to sign long-term contracts with retail companies, and Section 5 
approximates the implications on electricity prices. Section 6 presents additional sources 
of distortions of investment in generating capacity. Section 7 discusses capacity 
mechanisms to increase investment, and Section 8 reflects upon the impact of inter-
system trade. We conclude in Section 9. 
2 The theory of spot pricing 
Caramanis et. al. (1982) show that investors in a well-defined, unregulated market will 
provide sufficient investment in generating capacity. One frequently quoted requirement 
for the success of such liberalized energy markets is that demand is sufficiently price-
elastic so that the supply and demand functions always intersect. In practice, the 
observed short-term price-elasticity of electricity demand is low and supply and demand 
functions may not intersect. Revealed price elasticity is even lower, because high costs 
for equipment and operation of real time metering implies that few customers are 
exposed to real time prices (Littlechild 2003). 
 
Hence the system operator sometimes needs to shed load by interrupting electricity 
supply to groups of customers. A price cap needs to be instituted in the short-term market 
to protect consumers against excessive prices during these times (e.g. Ford, 1999; Hobbs 
et al., 2001b; Stoft, 2002). If consumers are not involved in real-time price setting, they 
otherwise may find themselves paying more than their value of lost load (VOLL). It is 
difficult, however, to establish the correct level for the price cap, because the value of 
lost load is difficult to determine. Estimates suggest that the value of lost load is some 
two orders of magnitude higher than regular electricity prices, but they vary widely 
among each other (Willis and Garrod, 1997; Ajodhia et al., 2002). 
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Stoft (2002) shows that in a perfectly competitive market, a price cap at VOLL results in 
an optimal level of investment in generating capacity, with an optimal duration of power 
interruptions. This suggests that spot pricing is applicable even if revealed demand is 
fully inelastic. Rotating black-outs at times when demand exceeds supply at the price cap 
cause inefficiencies because consumers are inhomogeneous and some would prefer to 
pay a higher price to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply, while others would prefer 
more frequent interruptions if that would lower their electricity bill. However, even a 
public enterprise with benevolent management would face the same dilemma.4 It can 
only be resolved with real-time metering and pricing or active demand side management. 
It is unclear whether the installation and transaction costs of such technology are 
justified. 
 
Borenstein and Holland (2003) analyze intra-annual price volatility and conclude that full 
real-time pricing attains the first-best capacity investment (result 3) while time-invariant 
retail prices result in inefficient consumption decisions and distorted investment 
decisions. Intra-annual price volatility is averaged over the course of a year and therefore 
creates little price risk for agents. Hence their analysis ignores the effects of risk 
aversion. We complement their analysis by focusing on the inter-annual price volatility 
for which risk aversion can no longer be ignored. To simplify our analysis we abstract 
from the intra-annual price volatility. 
 
Even with long-term contracting, spot markets will are needed to allow parties to trade 
imbalances relative to their contractual positions or even to replace their own generation 
with electricity bought in the market if that is more economical. Spot markets provide a 
reference price for contracts for difference, multi-part tariffs or demand-side 
management programs which allow for savings if some load can be interrupted. An 
example of the latter is a tariff that specifies that a consumer can always receive his 
average annual electricity demand at the fixed retail price. If the consumer reduces 
demand, then he will be paid for at the difference between wholesale price and retail 
tariff, while if he increases demand, he has to pay according to the wholesale price for 
the additional energy. An extreme version of this program was successfully implemented 
                                                 
4
 Joskow (1976) provides a survey of marginal cost pricing by regulated utilities and Chao (1983) shows 
the joint impact of uncertainty about demand and supply. 
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in Brazil to combat the energy shortage of the hydro system in 2002. Consumers could 
receive 80% of average consumption at usual retail rates.5 If they exceeded this level of 
consumption, they were first warned and subsequently disconnected. This extreme 
version was probably required in a society with high inequality to ensure that not only 
poor people, who are more price sensitive, contribute to the solution of the energy crisis. 
One would expect that in countries with less inequality price based mechanisms would 
work equally well. 
 
When we subsequently refer to long-term contracts, we imply that consumers or 
franchises sign contracts for differences on behalf of consumers to cover the price risk on 
their expected consumption, or are exposed to a fixed retail tariff for their expected 
demand which is based on the prices paid for long-term contracts. These tariffs would be 
complemented by mechanisms to encourage demand side management as described 
above. 
3 Risk aversion in the absence of long-term contracts 
3.1 Introduction 
The investment decision can be describe as a two-stage game (Figure 1). In stage 1, 
investors decide how much generating capacity K to provide, and in stage 2 the spot 
markets determine how these capacity is allocated to different consumers C. We abstract 
from daily and seasonal demand volatility and only assess a representative demand and 
consumption for each year. This simplification can possibly be justified by the 
observation that in liberalized markets price spikes, which develop during a limited 
number of hours when demand is close to available capacity, provide the main revenues 
to cover fixed and capital costs. Hence the volume of generating capacity and demand 
during these hours have a crucial impact upon consumer expenditures, generator profits 
and investment decisions. We assume that consumers and investors behave 
competitively. 
                                                 
5
 Information about the Brasilian electricity crisis can be found at: 
http://www.energiabrasil.gov.br/EnergiaBrasil.htm 
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Investment stage
Capacity K
t
Spot market
Consumption C
Uncertainty
 
Figure 1: Two-stage investment model
 
As investments in generating capacity take years to complete, we will introduce 
uncertainty about future demand between these two stages. To facilitate the analysis, we 
assess different causes of uncertainty which affect different groups of users. In section 
3.2 we assume one homogeneous group of consumers, all of which are affected 
simultaneously by e.g. a cold winter. Section 3.3 assumes that two groups of consumers, 
industrial and private, are connected to the network. In this section, certain causes of 
uncertainty, like the business cycle, are assumed to impact industrial demand but not to 
affect private consumption directly. 
 
For each of these cases we first calculate the generating capacity that risk-neutral 
consumers would contract for. This corresponds exactly to the volume of capacity that 
risk-neutral investors would finance if they fund the investment with revenues from the 
spot market. In the absence of risk aversion, hedging contracts are not necessary and 
short-term contracting suffices to implement the first best solution. We use the volume of 
generating capacity which risk neutral agents would install as a reference. 
 
In the second part of the analysis for each type of uncertainty we assume that consumers 
and investors are risk averse.6 We calculate how the volume of long-term contracts 
signed by consumers (and hence the equilibrium volume of generation investment) 
                                                 
6
 While the assumption of risk aversion on the consumer side appears widely shared, for investors risk 
aversion can easily be justified for all price risk that is correlated with the market evolution by using the 
capital asset pricing model. Electricity demand growth is highly correlated with the evolution of the GDP 
and therefore with the performance of the economy and stock markets. This implies that low growth brings 
about both low electricity prices and low stock returns, which is an unfavorable situation to investors in 
electricity generating capacity. So investors are risk-averse because they cannot hedge the risk of low 
electricity prices in other markets. Furthermore, for two reasons investors do not appreciate volatility of 
annual profits that is uncorrelated with the stock market. Firstly, it is costly because it distorts the signal of 
profits as an incentive mechanism for management, which was the initial justification for privatization. 
Secondly, it requires hedging over larger geographical regions or over several industries to smooth the 
volatility. This implies that ownership is more international, with the drawback that regulators are less 
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changes if consumers are risk averse. The first entry in the Figure 2 shows that, if all 
consumers face the risk of a common negative shock during which consumer utility 
decreases while consumption increases (e.g. due to a cold winter), risk aversion causes 
them to increase the volume of generating capacity they contract for. 
 
Source of 
Demand Uncertainty 
Consumer 
Reaction 
 
Investor 
Reaction 
negative shock K ↑ > K ↓ 
Aggregated  
Positive shock K ↓ = K ↓ 
Exogenous  K~ > K ↓ 
Figure 2: Change of installed capacity K caused by risk aversion 
Likewise we assess how the equilibrium volume of generation capacity provided by 
investors who sell their output through short-term contracts changes if they become risk 
averse. If investors are faced with uncertainty about future demand, then risk aversion 
reduces the equilibrium quantity of generating capacity they will provide in the market. 
Combining the equality for risk-neutral consumers and investors with the inequalities 
caused by risk aversion allows us to conclude that under an aggregate negative shock, 
risk-averse consumers will contract for more generating capacity with investors than 
risk-averse investors would provide if they did not sign long-term contracts for the 
marginal generating unit, but had to finance it based on revenues from short-term 
markets. Hence the equilibrium level of investment is reduced from the efficient, first-
best volume if generators are not able to sign long-term contracts with consumers. A 
similar analysis, performed for other types of uncertainty, is presented in Figure 2. 
3.2 Weather-related uncertainty of demand 
Because all consumers are affected similarly by weather, we assume only one 
homogeneous group of consumers. We calculate the volume of long-term contracts that 
consumers would sign with investors. We compare this to the equilibrium volume of 
generating capacity that investors provide who recover their investment in the spot 
                                                                                                                                                 
committed to respect the interests of the shareholders. Shareholders anticipate this and require higher 
returns. 
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market. Without uncertainty, both approaches result in the same volume of generating 
capacity. In the presence of uncertainty about future weather, risk-neutral agents develop 
more generating capacity than is required to match expected demand. The same 
equilibrium volume of generating capacity develops whether financed through long-term 
contracts by consumers or with spot-market revenues. In a third step we assume that 
consumers and investors are risk averse. They want to avoid decreases of their total 
utility, which is a function of their residual available money and their utility from 
electricity consumption. We find that risk-averse consumers contract for more generating 
capacity than risk-neutral consumers, but risk-averse investors offer less generating 
capacity than risk-neutral investors. 
3.2.1 Consumers’ perspective on weather-related uncertainty 
To begin with, we will assume that all consumers are exposed to the same unexpected 
cold winter which increases energy demand, e.g. for electric heating, lighting and water 
circulation. The weather condition ε  influences the monetary value that consumers 
derive from consuming a volume C of electricity: M(C,ε). A positive ε  means a colder 
winter than average. We further assume that (a) consumers benefit from more electricity, 
that (b) their comfort is decreased in colder winters but that (c) in colder winters the 
marginal monetary value of an additional unit of electricity increases:7 
 .0),()0),()0),()
2
>
∂∂
∂
<
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
C
CM
c
CMb
C
CM
a
ε
ε
ε
εε
 
To solve the model for the case of weather related uncertainty we assume the following, 
linear, relationship between C and ε, which will be defined differently in section 3.3 and 
3.4: 
M (C,ε)= M(C-ε), 
                                                 
7
 In this section the following notation will be used: 
K Installed Capacity ε, 2εσ  
Shock on demand or utility Utility 
function 
C (private) consumption D Industrial demand 
M Monetary value of electricity pi Consumer wealth (money and 
consumption) 
M=M’ Marginal monetary value U Utility derived from wealth 
P Short-term electricity price G Minimum investment per investor 
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and to avoid third derivatives define m as the willingness to pay, which is convex: 
m(C-ε)= M’(C-ε)>0      m’(C-ε)<0         m’’(C-ε)>0. (1) 
Consumers decide how much generating capacity K to invest in or contract for through 
long-term contracts. Without loss of generality, we normalize variable costs of 
generation to be 0. The cost of generating capacity therefore is cK, with c the long-run 
marginal cost of capacity. 
 
As we assumed that only one homogeneous group of consumers exists, no trade occurs to 
adjust for the realization of ε and each consumer uses all his available capacity C=K. We 
define consumers’ wealth pi as the monetary value of the electricity they consume M plus 
the other sources of wealth at their disposition (normalized to zero), minus their 
expenditures on electricity, which equal cK. Without uncertainty (ε=0),  consumers’ 
wealth pi is: 
pi(K)=M(K)-cK (2) 
Using the first order condition with respect to K gives the optimal volume of generating 
capacity KW without uncertainty: 
c=m(KW)  (3) 
If risk-neutral consumers face uncertainty about their future demand due to uncertainty 
about the weather, they will maximize their expected wealth, which is defined as follows: 
pi(K)=E[M(K-ε)-cK].  (4) 
The first order condition with regard to K renders the optimal volume of generating 
capacity for a risk-neutral consumer KN: 
c= E[m(KN -ε)].  (5) 
Willingness to pay m for energy is convex m’’>0, therefore E[m(KN - ε)]> m(KN). 
Willingness to pay for energy is also decreasing in consumption m’<0, therefore (3) and 
(5) can only both be satisfied if KW<KN. The optimal volume of generating capacity KN in 
an uncertain world with risk-neutral consumers exceeds the capacity KW, which would 
have been installed in the absence of uncertainty. Stoft (2002) already described this 
 12
result from the theory of consumption and investment under uncertainty, when he 
introduces uncertainty regarding the availability of generating capacity. 
Risk-averse consumers 
Let us introduce consumer utility U, which is a monotonic function of the wealth pi: 
U’(pi)>0. Utility of risk-neutral consumers increases linearly with wealth pi.8  By contrast, 
risk-averse agents exhibit a decreasing marginal utility with higher wealth levels: 
U’’(pi)<0. Consequently, (4) transforms into:9 
U=E[U{M(K-ε)-cK}].  (6) 
The FOC of (6) with respect to K gives an equation for the equilibrium volume of 
generating capacity KR which risk-averse consumers contract for: 
( ){ }
( ){ }[ ] 




 −Κ(  
 Κ ∗−
 Κ ∗−
= )
- KMU'E
-KMU'
  E c R
RR
RR ε
ε
ε
m
c
c
 (7) 
Equations (5) and (7) differ in the weighting factor w(ε)=U’(ε)/E[U’]. Using (1) gives 
∂w(ε)/∂ε=-U’’m/E[U’]>0 and ∂m(KR-ε)/∂ε=−m’>0, hence the average of a convex 
function exceeds the value the function takes at the avereage: 
E[w(ε)m(K-ε)] > E[w(ε)]E[m(K-ε)] = E[m(K-ε)]. (8) 
If we assume (hypothetically) that KR=KN, then the expected value of additional capacity 
(right hand side of (7)) would exceed the marginal costs c. Therefore risk-averse 
consumers contract for additional capacity KR>KN. They reduce the downside risk of 
cold winters by contracting for more energy than risk-neutral consumers. 
3.2.2 Investors’ perspective on weather-related uncertainty 
In a world without uncertainty, the spot-market price P equal the willingness to pay 
m(K). In a competitive world, new investors will enter the market until the equilibrium 
                                                 
8
 Formally: U(pi)=λpi. The value of λ is arbitrary; therefore we can set λ=1 so that U is the same as pi and 
use the simplified approach of maximizing wealth of risk-neutral consumers in (3) and (5). 
9
 Our representation of the utility function differs from the more general utility function. The general utility 
function states utility as two-dimensional function of consumed energy C and discretionary income -cK: 
V(C,-cK) and hence depicts R2 into R while we only use two functions depicting R into R. The more 
general representation coincides with our representation if for all C, cK: V1=U’M’ and V2=U’. 
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price P equals costs c of additional generating capacity, so P=c. Combining these two 
equations gives c=m(K), which is identical to (3). The market will therefore provide for 
the optimal investment quantity KW. 
 
In the presence of uncertainty, risk-neutral investors will ensure that, on average, they 
can recover their costs: c=P=E[m(K-ε)]. The exact correspondence with (5) shows that 
even in the presence of uncertainty the market will provide the appropriate volume of 
generation investment KN, as long as consumers and investors are risk neutral. 
 
If investors are risk averse, then their expected benefit from investing in G units of 
generating capacity at the aggregate investment level KI is: 
pi=E[Uinvest{G·(m(KI-ε)-c)}] (9) 
As investors are risk-averse, the marginal utility is decreasing in wealth (U’>0, U’’<0), 
therefore: 
E[Uinvest{G·(m(K-ε)-c)}]<Uinvest{G·E[(m(K-ε)-c)]}.  (10) 
If risk-averse investors would invest the same volume of generating capacity as risk-
neutral investors KN, then the right hand side of (10) would be zero, which would imply 
that the left-hand side would be negative. To increase the left-hand side, as required to 
satisfy (9), the investment level KI needs to fall below KN, because U’>0 and m’<0. The 
volume of generating capacity provided by risk-averse investors is therefore smaller than 
the volume provider by risk-neutral investors. Summarizing: 
 
Proposition 1: In anticipation of aggregate weather-related uncertainty of 
demand, risk-averse consumers which can sign long-term contracts will contract 
for more generating capacity than risk-neutral agents (KR>KN). Risk-averse 
investors who recover their investments in short term markets, however, construct 
less generating capacity than risk-neutral agents (KI<KN). 
3.3 Exogenous demand uncertainty 
Now we will assume that we have a homogeneous group of private electricity consumers 
and a second homogenous group of industrial consumers. Industrial demand is subject to 
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unexpected shocks, mainly due to the unpredictable development of the business cycle. 
Both industrial and private consumers are connected to the same electricity network and 
are part of the same market. Therefore private consumers are subject to price volatility 
induced by industrial consumers. 
 
If private consumers have signed a volume of long-term contracts K for their expected 
energy demand, then they retain the option to cover their anticipated consumption at no 
extra cost. However, they can improve upon this situation by increasing consumption if 
additional electricity can be bought cheaply at the wholesale level and by decreasing 
consumption if they can re-sell some of their energy at higher prices to the wholesale 
market. Hence private consumers with long-term contracts benefit from both types of 
deviations by industry demand. Obviously the argument equally applies to industry 
customers who have signed long-term contracts for their expected demand and deviate 
from their consumption to adjust to changes of private customers’ electricity demand. 
 
We will show that risk-averse investors who fund their generation investment with spot 
market returns will provide for less generating capacity than risk-neutral investors. Risk-
averse consumers will wish to contract for equilibrium quantities of capacity that exceed 
the quantity provided for by risk-averse investors. However, as individual consumers 
only contract small quantities beyond their expected demand, the marginal unit of 
generation investment to satisfy industrial demand would continue to be provided by 
merchant investors, unless industrial consumers sign long-term contracts. 
3.3.1 Consumers’ perspective on exogenous demand uncertainty 
In contrast to the previous section, consumers are note directly exposed to shocks, hence 
the monetary value of electricity M is only a function of consumption C. As two groups 
of agents are active, they now have the option to trade in the spot market. Relative to 
equation (2), the wealth function of consumers pi therefore not only contains the decision 
variable K for the investment or long-term contracting decision, but also the option to 
trade in the spot market by choosing consumption C different from K. The spot market 
price P results from total installed capacity K minus industrial demand D, which is 
subject to a shock ε and private consumption C which adjusts with industry demand 
shock ε. 
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pi(K,C(ε))=M(C(ε))-cK+(K-C(ε))·P(K-D-ε-C(ε)) (11) 
To determine the optimal consumption decision of consumers, we differentiate (11) with 
respect to C and obtain M’(C)=m(C)=P(K-D-ε-C). The willingness to pay for electricity 
m equals the spot market price of electricity P. Note that individual consumers are not 
assumed to influence the market price, so P’=0. 
 
How does the consumption of consumers change with changes of industry demand ε? 
We differentiate m(C)=P(K-D-ε-C) with respect to ε and, as all private consumers are 
acting simultaneously, also consider the impact upon the market clearing price, using 
P’<0. As expected, private consumption decreases with increased industry consumption 
ε:
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To determine the optimal investment quantity K for risk-neutral consumers under 
uncertainty we form the expectation of (11) over all possible realizations of ε: 
pi(K)=E[M(C(ε)) - CεP(K-I-ε- C(ε))] + KE[P(K-D-ε- C(ε))-c]. (13) 
Differentiating with respect to K and remembering that competitive consumers do not 
consider their impact on the market price (P’(C)=0), we find again the equilibrium 
quantity KN of risk-neutral consumers: 
c=E[P(KN -D-ε- C(ε))].  (14) 
To determine the equilibrium price, we expand (14) as a second order Taylor series and 
use (12). As the industry demand shock ε is normalized, so E(ε)=0 , the first order term is 
zero and the dominant term is of second order: 
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If the demand function is convex (P’’>0, m’’>0), investment is higher under uncertainty 
and hence the market-clearing price P at expected demand (ε=0) is below the long-run 
marginal cost c (14). This corresponds to the previous result that equilibrium installed 
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generating capacity is higher under uncertainty than required to cover the expected 
demand: KW <KN. 
Risk-averse consumers 
Now let us assume that consumers are risk-averse, which we will represent, as before, by 
inserting a concave utility function: U’>0, U’’<0 in (13). 
U(K)=E[U{M(C(ε)) - C(ε)P(K-I-ε- C(ε))+K(P(K-I-ε- C(ε))-c) }]. (16) 
Differentiating with respect to K and then expanding in a second order Taylor series in 
ε and substituting C’ and C’’ from (12) gives: 
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Risk aversion has two counterbalancing effects. In the denominator it adds the third term 
relative to the risk-neutral case (15). This term is negative and therefore reduces 
investment beyond expected demand. It corresponds to a similar term in the function for 
investors (which is discussed below) and shows that risk-averse consumers, like 
investors, are less likely to take this speculative position. This reduction of generation 
investment is countered by the denominator decreasing in volatility (assuming U’’’ is 
positive (as for log utility) or not too negative to dominate the first term). Consumers can 
choose a convex combination of consumption and revenues from selling contracted 
capacity and are hence more inclined to contract for additional generating capacity. 
3.3.2 Investors’ perspective on exogenous demand uncertainty 
Assume that investors face uncertainty about price, identical to (9). As both risk-averse 
consumers and investors reduce the equilibrium volume of generating capacity relative to 
the risk-neutral reference case, we will quantify their reduction to allow a comparison. 
Replace m(K-ε) with P(K-D-ε-C(ε)) in (9) and then make a second-order Taylor 
expansion in ε. As for consumers, second order is required because E(ε)=0. Then 
developing around the risk free equilibrium quantity K0 with P(K0)-c)=0 in first order, 
and using Uinvest(G(P(K0)-c)) = Uinvest(0) = 0 gives: 
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Comparing (18) and (15) we observe that risk-aversion adds an additional, negative 
component on the rhs. (U’’<0, U’>0, bracket>0). Therefore they will invest less, in 
equilibrium, than risk-neutral investors or consumers. Comparing risk averse investors 
with risk averse consumers we note that the denominator of (17) exceeds the value of the 
bracket in (18) if 
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The condition is satisfied if there are transaction and information costs associated with 
investing in merchant generation, so that it hence requires a sufficiently large investment 
volume G per investor which exceeds the excess contracting K-C, even if it is scaled by a 
factor of two and the curvatures of investors’ and consumers’ utility functions. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the denominator of (17) is smaller than 1, which reinforces 
the effect that consumers will contract in equilibrium for more generating capacity than 
would be provided for by risk averse investors. 
 
Proposition 2: In anticipation of an exogenous demand shock (e.g. to another 
country or industry), risk-neutral investors and consumers contract for the same 
volume of generating capacity, which is larger than the volume contracted for by 
risk-averse investors. Typically risk-averse consumers contract for more 
generating capacity than would be provided for by risk averse investors. 
 
3.3.3 Conclusion about effect of risk aversion and uncertainty 
The discussed sources of uncertainty result in less investment in generating capacity than 
the first-best solution, which allows for long-term contracting. So why do we anticipate 
that consumers do not sign a sufficient volume of long-term contracts? 
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4 Obstacles to long-term contracts 
In most instances, generators do not sell their electricity directly to final consumers but to 
retail companies which act as intermediaries. One might expect that retail companies 
constitute an appropriate counterpart for long-term contracts. Figure 2, however, 
illustrates why generating companies would only sign a limited volume of long-term 
contracts with retail companies in an environment of strong retail competition. Assume 
that the price of a long-term contract corresponds to the average wholesale price during 
the period shown in the figure. In periods with average wholesale prices and retail prices 
above long-term contract prices, like in 2003, retail companies benefit and generators 
lose from their long-term contracts. In exchange, generators would expect to win from 
long-term contracts in periods with low wholesale prices, like during 1999-2000. But in 
such periods, new retail companies may enter the market and offer cheap retail 
electricity. If the regulatory agencies succeed in achieving retail competition, then 
switching costs will be low for consumers and they will move towards these new retail 
companies. Under such circumstances, all retail companies would need to follow. Retail 
companies with existing long-term contracts would incur losses. Some eventually would 
go bankrupt and would not honor their contracts. Generators would anticipate the 
resulting decrease in profits from long-term contracts and therefore be reluctant to sign 
significant volumes of long-term contracts with supply-companies. Analysis by Woo et 
al. (2003) confirms the implied result - trading of forward and futures-contracts is thin in 
liberalized markets. 
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Figure 2: Norwegian retail prices linked to wholesale price.10 
The risk to generators stems from the fact that retail companies may lose their customers 
to new retail companies in times when their long-term contracts exceed the short-term 
price. Car or liability insurance contracts pool the risk over a group of people at any 
period of time and hence can be switched at any point in time, which facilitates 
competition. Long-term electricity contracts average the risk over time and would 
therefore need to be signed a number of years ahead of time, with a rolling horizon of at 
least the same length. Therefore any switching by consumers would require a transfer 
between consumer and retail company equal to the current difference between the value 
of the forward electricity contract and the average spot price for the duration of the 
contract. This could potentially involve large sums, which would inhibit switching. 
Long-term energy contracts would hence be more similar to life insurance contracts, 
which are typically only signed once in a lifetime, with large commissions involved, and 
therefore require strict regulation. 
 
An institutional change, which would create a credible counterpart for generators to sign 
long-term contracts, could solve the problem. If, for example, retail companies held 
                                                 
10
 Source: Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no, The distribution/retail margin was assumed to be the 
average difference between retail price excluding tax and wholesale price during the observation period: 
7.15 Øre/kWh. 
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regional monopolies, consumers would not have the option to switch. The most direct 
way to maintain generation adequacy would therefore be to retain the consumer franchise 
(Newbery, 2002). 
 
A less direct approach is to allow retail companies to offer long-term contracts to 
consumers, accepting that such contracts might increase switching costs and thereby limit 
competition at the retail level.11 It is uncertain, however, whether consumers would sign 
such long-term contracts if they have not yet experienced high peak prices. If the 
majority of consumers do not sign long-term contracts, the regulator may still intervene 
at times of high prices, rendering long-term contracts useless for individual consumers. 
 
If final customers have difficulty switching retail companies due to the transaction costs, 
then retail companies effectively own a franchise and can sign long-term contracts with 
generators. The reduction of competition brought about by restrictions on switching is 
likely to require regulatory price controls of retail tariffs. If tariffs need to be regulated, 
then there seems to be little benefit from `competition` at the retail level, and transaction 
costs for systems to allow for switching can be avoided by retaining the consumer 
franchise. 
 
One might argue that vertical integration by generators into the retail sector, which is 
common, has the (side) effect of effectively creating long-term contracts between 
generation and retail companies. However, if the retail market is competitive, then 
integration of supply and generation companies does not provide the required long-term 
contracts to secure investment, because final customers are not included in the long-term 
contract. At times of low wholesale electricity prices, final customers could continue to 
switch suppliers and vertically integrated retail companies will also lose their customers. 
Therefore vertically integrated generation and retail companies cannot offer electricity 
tariffs corresponding to long run marginal costs, but will vary the tariffs with the average 
wholesale price. 
 
                                                 
11
 In the UK, retail companies are now again allowed to sign long-term contracts with final consumers to 
improve investment in energy efficiency (The Guardian, 24.11.2003). 
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As an alternative to long-term contracts signed by retail companies, one can envisage 
consumers signing financial contracts for differences with generation companies. Such 
contracts would not need to be linked to electricity demand or supply but would only be 
risk-hedging instruments (which banks or other institutions could distribute). If 
wholesale prices exceed the long-term average price, then generation companies 
reimburse consumers for the difference; if they fall below the long-term average price 
then consumers pay the difference to the generation companies. In a simplified, 
theoretical perspective this approach would provide the same degree of risk hedging as 
long-term contracts signed by the retail company. However, practical implementation 
may suffer from several factors. If electricity prices are low and generation companies 
expect money from customers they may face the typical difficulty of a creditor – it is 
costly to collect money from individual small customers. Furthermore, in a society that is 
becoming increasingly mobile, it appears difficult to collect debt from customers who 
have moved away, while the same customers would be substantially more willing to stay 
in contact if they could receive money at times of high wholesale prices. 
5 Quantification of the Effect 
Electricity demand is intrinsically difficult to forecast as it is driven by climate, 
technological evolution and business cycles. The logarythmic representation in Figure 3 
shows that the long-term trend of electricity demand growth is stable. However, the 
random variations in the year to year changes are difficult to predict. 
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Figure 3: French electricity generation     South Korean electricity generation 
 22
Assume peak demand evolves in parallel with annual consumption, then Figure 4 
illustrates not only the variations of annual electricity demand but can be interpreted as 
errors in the prediction of future peak demand.  
 
 
 
 Average Growth Standard Error Period 
S-Korea 9.7% 4.5% 70-99 
China PR 8.8% 2.7% 70-99 
USSR 4.1% 1.4% 70-91 
W-Germany 3.4% 3.5% 70-91 
France 5.5% 3.0% 70-97 
UK 1.2% 2.8% 70-97 
USA 3.0% 2.4% 70-97 
Figure 4: Annual average growth rate and standard deviation based on UN Energy 
Statistics 
To ensure that peak demand is covered even in years with unexpected high electricity 
demand generation capacity has to be provided to cover these peaks.12 In line with the 
crude approximation in this section assume that such peaks are expected to occur in one 
out of four years. The extra capacity installed has to cover fixed and annual fixed costs of 
operation during this one out of four years, hence peak prices have to rise in this year. As 
we are mainly concerned about revenue and cost streams it suffices to compute the 
impact on the average annual electricity price which will rise in the peak years by a level 
such that fixed costs of peak units can be recovered. In our calculations we assume an 
open cycle gas turbine with investment costs of £300/kw.13,14 If contractual arrangements 
ensure constant revenue streams, then such peak units could be financed at weighted 
                                                 
12
 The alterantive option is to cover peaks with demand side response. Figure 4 is based on generation and 
hence already includes demand side response as generation equals demand minus demand side response 
minus losses. 
13
 The capacity price is taken from Rob and Richey (1998).  
14
 We ignore annual fixed costs (e.g. network connection and staff) which can potentially be avoided due to 
mouthballing but would otherwise increase the observed price volatility and if financed through the capital 
market also the impact of higher weighted average costs of capital. 
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average costs of capital of approx 7%, implying annual capital costs are 8.5% of 
investment volume if economic life time of the asset is 25 years.15 
 
Would the capital costs for the back up capacity be distributed over 8760 hours per year 
then the capital cost of peaking capacity are £2.8/MWh. However, peak units only 
recover their fixed costs at times of higher demand. Hence prices in high demand years 
have to rise sufficiently to allow peak units to recover their fixed costs in these years, 
average electricity price will increase by £11.4/MWh in one out of four years. This 
implies a standard deviation of annual electricity prices of £5.7/MWh, which corresponds 
to calculations for Nordpool of £5.9/MWh (Green 2004).  
Average electricity price 
This uncertainty in revenue streams is anticipated by investors, and following anecdotal 
evidence, we assume that merchant peaking plants imply at least 14% weighted cost of 
capital, hence the annual capital cost rise to 14.5%, and the capital cost of a peaking units 
distributed over 8760 hours increase to £5.0/MWh. The higher rate of return for peaking 
units increases the average electricty price by £2.1/MWh.  
Technology Choice 
If the institutional environment prevents large fractions of demand to be covered by long-
term contracts, then new generation has to be build on a merchant base. Assuming that 
peaking capacity has to be financed at 14% weighted cost of capital then the time 
weighted electricity price will has to increase by £20/MWh in one out of four years to 
recover the capital costs and hence the standart deviation of annual electricity prices is 
£9.9/MWh. This annual price volatility is significant given average electricity prices in 
the order of £25/MWh. Even so this volatility should average out over the livetime of a 
plant, anecdotal evidence suggests that investors prefer stable revenue streams and hence 
add a risk premium to projects with voliatie revenue streems. This can significantly 
distort the technology choice. For a combined cycle gas turbine financed at 7% weighted 
cost of capital the capital cost contributes approximately 20% to average cost. An 
increase in weighted cost of capital from 7% to 12% increases capital cost by 50% and 
                                                 
15
 We have tried to use conservative estimates, so that the effects that we describe may be larger. 
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long run marginal cost by 10%. Contrast this to a renewable energy plant which is 
typically assumed to be capital intensive, lets 70% of long run marginal costs are capital 
costs. The same increase of the required rate of return increases long run marginal cost 
for the renewable plant by 35%. Hence even if the renewable plant would have been in a 
position to compete with the combined cycle gas turbine in a market framework which 
allows for long term contracting, its long run marginal cost will exceed the gas turbine by 
25% in the environment without long-term contracting.  
Consumer impact 
The main impact of lacking long-term contracts or similar arangements on consumers 
will be due to the increased electricity price caused by higher financing costs. The 
volatility of electricity prices, e.g. an increase of 11.4£/MWh (lower bound) in scarce 
years, implies an increase of final consumer prices of approximatly 20%. One third of the 
households in the UK spend 8% of their total household income on energy,16 and if we 
assume the average split between gas and electricity bill 45% also applies to this group, 
then they have to spend an additional 1% of their household income on electricity in 
times of peak demand. Given large fractions of household income are typically commited 
to rent and other long-term commitments the this volatility will be noticed.  
6 Additional distortions of investment decisions 
The previous sections argued that risk-averse investors who cover their production with 
short-term contracts will provide for less generating capacity than in the first-best world 
that allows for long-term contracting. Investors typically only have imperfect information 
about future demand and supply (Hobbs et al., 2001c; Stoft, 2002). To calculate their 
revenues, investors need to anticipate future electricity prices which are a function of 
difficult to anticipate demand and available generating capacity (Hobbs et al., 2001a). 
Long-term contracts reveal information about both demand and supply side and hence 
can reduce this uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
16
 Detailed break downs of fuel poverty in England in 2001, version July 2003, Summary report presenting 
data produced by the Building Reseearch Establishment on behalf of DTI and Defra. 
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Regulatory changes increases investment risk and therefore adversely impacts the 
willingness to invest. For example the Electricity Directive that was recently adopted by 
the EU (Directive 2003/54/EC), the large combustion plant directive (2001/80/EC) or the 
recently adopted CO2 emissions trading scheme (EC, 2002/EC 2003) will influence 
country-specific regulation, as does the liberalization process of the European gas 
market. A second source of regulatory uncertainty is caused by possible lack of 
regulatory commitment. Will a regulator sustain the public pressure in a period of high 
prices and not react by reducing the price cap in order to limit the pries?17 If the 
possibility exists, then generators have to discount future revenues during high price 
periods while they are unlikely to expect symmetric regulatory support during periods 
with low prices (Skantze and Ilic, 2001). 
 
Ford (1999) uses a system dynamics model to show that investment in electricity 
generation facilities is inherently unstable if investment decisions are influenced by 
current prices rather than by predicted future prices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
investment projects are delayed when spot prices are below long-term average costs. 
When spot prices reach long-term average costs and investment projects can move 
forward, then the time delay to bring the new capacity online implies that prices will first 
increase well above the long-term average costs before the addition of new generating 
capacity brings them down again. Visudhiphan et al. (2001) contend that investment 
cycles are not inevitable, as long as investors are able to anticipate market developments. 
However, it is likely that investors put excessive weight on current and past observations. 
 
A significant vulnerability of electricity markets is that generating companies have both 
opportunity and incentives to increase electricity prices, as demonstrated during the 
electricity crisis in California (Joskow and Kahn, 2002). When the capacity margin is 
slim, the low price-elasticity of demand means that a unilateral reduction of the supply of 
electricity, e.g. by listing generating units as requiring unscheduled maintenance, can be 
profitable even for small generation companies (CPUC, 2002). Price increases due to 
market power should attract more investment, as they represent an opportunity to make 
more profit. In the UK, new entry was possible in the past, because low gas prices 
                                                 
17
 In San Diego, even already a brief period of high consumer prices proved politically unacceptable 
(Liedtke, 2000).  
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allowed entry with relatively small combined cycle generators. The long-term contracts 
for the generating companies’ output, which the retail companies signed, facilitated the 
investment by securing revenues for the generating companies. On the other hand, if new 
market entrants know that the high prices are a consequence of market power, and not of 
real scarcity, they may hesitate to enter the market, as an increase in competition could 
cause prices to drop to the marginal cost of generation. Because market power is mainly 
exercised at times close to full capacity utilization, it is difficult to assess whether high 
prices are caused by market power or scarcity. This uncertainty also affects policy 
makers and regulators, who may react to the perceived abuse of market power with the 
implementation of a price cap below the value of lost load. Such price caps reduce the 
expected return on electricity investment and thereby reduce the equilibrium investment 
volume (Oren, 2000; Newbery, 2001). 
 
Incumbent generating companies may benefit from entry barriers which prevent third 
parties from providing new generating capacity: permitting is likely to be easier at 
existing locations, where there often is space for an additional unit (e.g. in the place of a 
dismantled old unit), and because at these sites the cost of a new unit is lower, if the fuel 
supply, electricity and cooling infrastructures already exist. In addition, large incumbent 
firms may obtain the necessary capital more easily. If entry is restrained, then Von der 
Fehr (1997) shows that incumbents may limit capacity investment to increase spot prices. 
 
Boom (2003) compares a monopoly and duopoly in a two-stage model of investment and 
energy market with fixed retail tariffs and uncertainty about future demand. The duopoly 
may provide for less generating capacity then a monopolist, if this ensures higher energy 
prices in the energy spot market where the players compete in a Bertrand like game. 
7 Capacity mechanisms 
A number of adjustments to the market structure, which we will call capacity 
mechanisms have been applied or proposed, for the purpose of securing the adequacy of 
generation resources. A brief overview of the most important ones follows. 
 27
Capacity payments 
Payments for installed or available capacity attempt to convert the irregular revenues 
from price spikes to a more constant revenue stream for generation companies. They 
have been applied in the former England and Wales Pool and subsequently in Spain (as 
part of the stranded cost reimbursement) and several South-American countries. 
Strategic reserve 
An option which often is proposed is a so-called ‘mothball reserve’, a collection of 
mothballed old plants maintained by the system operator as back-up capacity. A variation 
is the tendering procedure, which is proposed in the new directive of the EU (Directive 
2003/54/EC). The open question is when to deploy such reserve capacity. If the market is 
to perform its regular task and invest in generating capacity, it should be able to rely 
upon periodical price spikes to finance its investment in peaking units. This means that 
the reserve should only be deployed at a high price, namely a price equal to the value of 
lost load. Will it be politically sustainable to allow prices to rise to the strike price for any 
length of time if earlier deployment of mothball reserve can easily reduce the price? 
Operating reserves pricing 
Another option is for the system operator to contract operating reserves in excess of the 
reserves which are contracted to maintain system stability. This provides a revenue 
stream for peaking units. If spot prices exceed the maximum price the system operator is 
willing to pay for strategic reserve, then generators will sell the capacity in the spot 
market and no longer to the system operator (Stoft, 2002). The system operator’s demand 
for reserve capacity increases the frequency and duration of price spikes, but his 
maximum willingness to pay limits their height. Spot prices can only exceed the system 
operator’s willingness to pay when all capacity that usually is contracted by the system 
operator as strategic reserves is offered in the spot market. This system can be interpreted 
as an increase of demand with a price-elastic section, which reduces price volatility and 
therefore makes it easier to determine future revenues from price spikes. 
Capacity requirements 
A system of capacity requirements, such as the ICAP system, is used by PJM on the East 
Coast of the USA (described in Besser et al., 2002.). In this system, large customers and 
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retail companies who represent small customers are required to purchase firm capacity to 
cover their expected peak demand. Capacity can be provided by either generators within 
the control area, by out-of-area producers if corresponding transmission capacity can be 
secured, or by interruptible load. The system ensures that generating capacity generators 
receive a revenue stream in addition to the energy market. 
Reliability contracts 
A disadvantage of capacity requirements is that they do not mitigate the incentive to use 
market power to increase the electricity price by withholding generating capacity. An 
alternative which is intended to mitigate this shortcoming is provided by reliability 
contracts. These are a form of call options which the system operator purchases from the 
generation companies (Vázquez et al., 2002). When the spot price exceeds the strike 
price of the options, the producers are required to pay the system operator the difference 
between the spot price and the strike price. Operating power plants are a perfect hedge 
for the generators: their net income is equal to the strike price. Generation companies 
who have sold options which are not covered by available generating capacity when the 
options are called, lose on those options. This provides an incentive to generation 
companies to sell an option volume, which is equal to the available volume of generating 
capacity under their control. A second advantage is that the risk of exposure to high spot 
prices gives an incentive to generation companies to maximize the availability of their 
generation units during periods of scarcity. The system operator determines the level of 
overall generation adequacy by the volume of options he purchases. 
8 Trade between electricity systems 
Trade between liberalized electricity systems should not change the basic market 
dynamics. If the involved systems are liberalized in similar ways, trade between them 
only represents an increase of scale. The scale of the system does not impact the question 
of generation adequacy, as it is addressed in this paper. A benefit of a larger 
interconnected system is that they allow aggregating over errors of demand and supply 
predictions and therefore relative error margins should be smaller. 
 
In practice, interconnected electricity systems often have quite different rules, both 
within their markets and for access to the interconnection capacity. In the European 
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Union, Article 24 of the Directive allows member states ‘in the event of a sudden crisis’ 
to take unspecified ‘safeguard measures’ (Directive 2003/54/EC). This can be interpreted 
as giving member states the right to curtail exports temporarily in an emergency. While 
there may be technical reasons for doing so, this means that in case of a shortage of 
generation capacity, the European internal market may divide into a number of 
unconnected national markets. Does this require that each country needs to provide for its 
own generation adequacy? 
 
Trade between systems with different rules complicates the implementation of capacity 
mechanisms. During a regional episode of scarcity, systems which choose to provide 
incentives for generation investment may find that the output from some of their plants is 
sold to neighboring systems, which did not incur the costs of capacity mechanisms. 
Harmonization of rules clearly is the solution, but may not be feasible in the near term. 
Countries seeking to implement a capacity mechanism can either wait for a regional 
consensus to emerge, or implement an individual solution, which may be more costly and 
less effective than a regional solution. 
9 Conclusions 
The theory of spot pricing suggests that energy spot markets will provide sufficient 
incentive to invest in generating capacity. This result still holds in the presence of 
uncertainty. However, we show that without long-term contracts or similar mechanisms 
the result no longer holds if investors or final consumers are risk averse. We identify 
several types of uncertainty that induce risk-averse investors to reduce the equilibrium 
volume of generating capacity relative to risk-neutral investors. In contrast, if consumers 
could sign long-term contracts or invest directly in electricity generation, they would 
provide for more investment quantity than risk-neutral investors or consumers. 
 
The high inter-annual price uncertainty in electricity markets may prompt regulators to 
intervene during periods of high prices, which limits the expected revenues and therefore 
reduces the incentive to invest in generating capacity. Because the construction of 
generation plants is characterized by a long lead-time and their economic life is long as 
well, incomplete information about the future evolution of demand and supply increases 
investment risk. The limited predictability of futu
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companies to rely more upon current prices in their investment decisions. This may result 
in investment cycles. 
 
Electricity prices are higher and more volatile if investment is funded through spot 
market revenues. High inter-annual price volatility results in a higher risk-premium on 
capital. If this risk-premium is not a function of underlying fundamentals, but is caused 
by failures in market design, then it biases investment towards less capital-intensive 
technologies. This presents a particular obstacle to renewable energy sources, which tend 
to have the highest ratio between capital costs and operational expenditure. 
 
Generation adequacy is improved if institutional arrangements allow generators to sign 
long-term contracts with final consumers or if competition between retail companies is 
weak. If switching by consumers is unlikely, retail companies are better able to sign 
long-term contracts on behalf of them. However, in this case it is likely that the retail 
tariff needs to be regulated, and one may ask whether it would be better to reinstate 
properly regulated consumer franchises. A number of capacity mechanisms have been 
proposed to make the demand for reserve capacity more explicit and reduce investment 
risk for generation companies. 
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